What investors can learn from Sherlock Holmes
And
Cranswick PLC
(Illustration courtesy of Wikipedia)
It is well known that a series of psychological traits impede our performance
as investors. These include:
ü
A
propensity to buy when we feel good and, conversely, to sell when we are
unhappy.
ü
Overconfidence
from familiarity with the industry or company in question.
ü
Blaming
external factors when things go wrong, while claiming credit when an investment
turns out well.
ü
Foregoing
our own time-consuming analysis for the opinions of others.
ü
Allowing
intuition to influence our judgement.
ü
Giving
preference to information that is easily available, while failing to notice
what is missing.
ü
Focusing
on one element at the cost of ignoring other equally important elements.
ü
If one
element seems positive, other elements will seems so too, and those that don't
will be subconsciously reasoned away (the 'halo effect').
ü
Reacting
with haste to an event that at the time seems important, but in the long run is
insignificant.
The psychologist Maria Konnikova (Mastermind: How to Think like
Sherlock Holmes) has written a book about how we can avoid these
psychological traps by studying the behaviour of Sherlock Holmes. Her insights
are applicable to investors.
1. As he tackles a new mystery, Sherlock Holmes exclaims
"The game's afoot"! "That mindset is incredibly important,
because that's the way he sees it, and that's why it's exciting and engaging to
him," says Konnikova. A sense of play is vital to have "a presence of
mind that not only allows us to extract more from whatever it is we are doing but
make us feel better and happier." One has to enjoy investing - and why
not? - see it as a game with serious consequences, to maintain the diligence,
concentration and openness of mind that are the prerequisites for success. Warren
Buffett's letters to his shareholders exude the pleasure he gets from his
business. That keeps him enthusiastically and successfully at the helm of Berkshire
Hathaway at the age of 82.
2. Holmes notes that "the improbable is not
impossible". Or, to put it in investing terms, when everyone is
convinced that X is the right strategy, the thoughtful investor will wonder if
it might not be Y or Z. To do so he develops his own theories. This requires
method, discipline and patience. Holmes's method is to make lists of all the
relevant facts; he bounces ideas off Watson; he steps back and plays the violin,
or he has "a three pipe problem". "Distance . . . forces quiet
reflection and has been shown to improve cognitive performance and
self-control," notes Konnikova. Only when Holmes is sure of his ground
does he act. This slow, deliberate procedure goes against our nature, which
Konnikova calls the System Watson, that jumps to conclusions. Buffett has
his own methodology. He accumulates information. He bounces ideas off his
partner Charlie Munger. He lives in Omaha, distant from Wall Street, and
ignores the crowd. He is renowned for following investment targets for long
periods.
3. Holmes is capable of completely ignoring the opinion of
others, but he listens to what they, especially Watson, have to say. The
investor keeps abreast of the financial news, but he is bombarded with opinions
he would be wise to ignore.
4. Holmes relies on deduction. "You lay out your chain
of reasoning and test possibilities until whatever remains is the truth." Conan
Doyle has Holmes say: "It may be that several explanations remain, in
which case one tries test after test until one or other of them has convincing
support." This is not so distant from trying to value a company. One must
place a value on its future and its future is uncertain and requires testing. What
might happen to its market, its management, and its financial results? One
method is discussed in the 20 February post on this blog on Warren Buffett
and Berkshire Hathaway http://thejoyfulinvestor.blogspot.co.uk/2013_02_17_archive.html.
The essence is to make a stab at what the company might be worth in, say, 5
years time, and then discount it back, allowing for a margin of safety. Only by working the numbers can one get a feel
for their validity. And, by valuing the company using different parameters (for
example earnings per share, return on equity and equity per share) one can pick
up inconsistencies in valuations, forcing further analyses.
All this can fall into place if you enjoy investing.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cranswick
PLC
Who would have thought that Warren Buffett's biggest
acquisition would be a boring old American railway company, the Burlington Northern
and Santa Fe Railroad? Boring businesses can offer the investor the best of
returns. Cranswick started as a business in pig feed, left that business
and went into pork sausages. Now it specialises in all pork products and
supplies the supermarkets in the UK. The company's share price has multiplied
by 80 times . . . The blue line represents Cranswick's share price
versus the FTSE 100 in green.
(Graph courtesy of Yahoo, click to enlarge)
Cranswick's success is based on a high
degree of specialisation, product innovation, quality production, brand
marketing and maintaining a close relationship with the all-important
supermarket chains. Just two of them account for over half Cranswick's
business. The company is capitalised at 490 million pounds and, in 2012, made
an after tax profit of 37 million on a turnover of 821 million. Exports, 90% to
Europe, accounted for only 3% of sales. The management note in the latest
Annual Report the "increased popularity of pork products", which is
largely attributable to "the competitive price of pork compared to other
proteins".
The company is self-financing. Net
equity has increased from 52 million to 296 million pounds since 2002, yet net
borrowings have increased by only 25 million. In the last 5 years, cash from
operations have paid for all its capital expenditure and dividends with 40
million to spare. Cranswick's growth is both organic, from its existing
products, and from a cluster of small acquisitions.
Some key data:
Item
|
Period
|
Value
|
Return on equity
|
Historical
|
12%
|
Return on equity
|
On 2001-2011 retained earnings
|
13%
|
Earnings
per share growth p.a.
|
2001-3 avge to 2010-12 avge
|
12%
|
Equity
per share growth p.a.
|
2002 to 2012
|
19%
|
Dividend yield
|
Current
|
2.8%
|
Price Earnings ratio
|
Current
|
14
|
Cranswick's balance sheet holds no surprises. Net borrowings are 8%
of equity. And the deficit on the defined pension scheme, closed in 2004, at
5.3 million pounds is but 2% of equity. By far the largest single investor is
Invesco Perpetual, with 29.4% of the outstanding shares.
Cranswick borrows at a weighted cost of 2.3%, and I have added 5% for
operational risk (more below) and 5% as a required profit and margin of safety
when calculating the following:
Valuation
based on:
|
Value
per share in pence
|
Discount
rate of 12.3%
|
|
5-year
earnings per share growth to 2017
|
914p
|
5-year
equity per share growth to 2017
|
1,348p
|
5-year
return on equity to 2017
|
879p
|
Average
|
1,047p
|
Current share price
|
1,014p
|
While the current share price is reasonably in line with the
valuation model, the cautious investor will note:
1. Earnings growth has slowed markedly in the past two years,
because of shrinking margins, and the company's share price is quite volatile.
It hit a 12 month low of 714p in October last year and reached a high of 1040p
on 22 March.
2. Cranswick is heavily dependent on its sales to the large UK
supermarkets, and margins would be severely depressed if one or more replaced
the company's branded products with their own and/or by the products of other
suppliers.
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