Truth in Financial Reporting
And GlaxoSmithKline
Truth by Olin Warner (1896) - bronze door,
Library of Congress, courtesy Wikipedia.
In this image, Truth holds up
a mirror and a serpent. She can look in the mirror to report faithfully what
she sees or she can be tempted by the serpent to distort what she knows. Human
nature has a tenuous link to truth. Company managers often bend the truth when
reporting the results of their companies to shareholders and other interested
parties. This is often related to the criteria for deciding their bonus
payments. It is a bad business.
Investors are generally aware of the
risk that exploration companies overstate their potential reserves and that new
tech companies overstate their potential sales. What is more worrying is the cosmetic
presentation of its accounts by a large, established company. Unfortunately,
this is fairly common and it can dupe the investing public.
Vodafone is a case in point. This is its 'performance
reporting' in the 2013 preliminary results.
Performance reporting 2013 2012
(In pounds million)
EBITDA 13,275
11,193
EBITDA margin
29.9% 29.4%
Adjusted operating profit 11,960
11,452
Adjusted profit before tax 10,528
10,156
Adjusted effective tax rate
24.5% 24.5%
Adjusted profit attributable
to equity shareholders
7,696 7,680
Adjusted earnings per share (pence) 15.65p
15.61p
Free cash flow 5,608
5,501
Net debt 26,958 24,425
A cursory reading of Performance reporting suggests that all is
well with Vodafone. This is not the case.
Vodafone's 2013 GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Practice) earnings
per share were 0.9p, not the 'performance' figure of 15.65p. Further, without the 6.5 billion pound contribution from Vodafone's
45% stake in Verizon Wireless, Vodafone would have made a pre-tax loss of 5.8
billion pounds in 2013. As Vodafone's management has no control over
Wireless, a 5.8 billion pre-tax loss is a better starting point for
reporting management's contribution than the 'performance' figure of a 10.5
billion profit. And see an earlier post at http://thejoyfulinvestor.blogspot.co.uk/2013_05_12_archive.html
It will not surprise the reader to learn that EBITDA (Earnings Before
Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortization) and 'adjusted cash flow' (a
figure not reported in the 2013 prelims) form two of the performance indicators
for calculating the bonus payable to top management. Earnings per share do not.
Most companies use performance indicators to calculate bonus payments, and it
is always enlightening to see what the Board believes to be the most important
measures of success.
The focus on EBITDA is dangerous,
because it is a misleading indicator of a company's profitability. This is
particularly true of Vodafone, which has a long history of taking huge
charges for goodwill impairment (26 billion these last 5 years). And Vodafone
cannot survive without spending large sums on capital expenditure (6.2 billion
pounds in 2013), which also gets written down. Neither is included in EBITDA.
This selection of favourable 'adjusted' figures enables Vodafone's
CEO to write, “Thanks to further strong progress this year in our key areas
of strategic focus − data, enterprise and emerging markets − and an excellent
performance from VZW, we have achieved good growth in adjusted operating profit
and adjusted earnings per share." Adjusted is the operative word.
The following table would be my starting point for evaluating the
business actually managed by Vodafone's management. I
have excluded 'Other income' as it includes foreign exchange gains and losses
and the profit on the sale of assets. Neither are core management activities.
Instead of the 71 billion pounds EBITDA, management should be concentrating
their efforts on the negligible profitability of the non-Wireless
business these past 5 years.
Vodafone results
|
2013
|
2012
|
2011
|
2010
|
2009
|
2009-2013
|
Pounds
million
| ||||||
REVENUE
|
44445
|
46417
|
45884
|
44472
|
41017
|
222235
|
EBITDA
|
13275
|
14474
|
14670
|
14735
|
14490
|
71644
|
Depreciation,
Amortization & loss on disposal of assets
|
7792
|
7906
|
7967
|
8011
|
6824
|
38500
|
OPERATING
PROFIT
|
5483
|
6568
|
6703
|
6724
|
7666
|
33144
|
IMPAIRMENTS
|
7700
|
4050
|
6150
|
2100
|
5900
|
25900
|
INTEREST
|
1483
|
1932
|
429
|
1512
|
2419
|
7775
|
MANAGEMENT PROFITS
|
-3700
|
586
|
124
|
3112
|
-653
|
-531
|
ASSOCIATES
|
6477
|
4963
|
5059
|
4742
|
4091
|
25332
|
OTHER
INCOME
|
478
|
3999
|
4315
|
820
|
751
|
10363
|
Profit Before Tax
|
3255
|
9548
|
9498
|
8674
|
4189
|
35164
|
TAX
|
2582
|
2546
|
1628
|
56
|
1109
|
7921
|
Profit After Tax
|
673
|
7002
|
7870
|
8618
|
3080
|
27243
|
MINORITIES
|
-244
|
-46
|
98
|
27
|
-2
|
-167
|
ATTRIBUTABLE
TO SHAREHOLDERS
|
429
|
6956
|
7968
|
8645
|
3078
|
27076
|
EARNINGS
PER SHARE
|
0.9p
|
13.7p
|
15.1p
|
16.4p
|
5.8p
|
Vodafone makes much of 'free cash flow',
but it is a flawed measure of a company's cash generating capacity when that
company requires sizeable other outlays to keep going. Vodafone is
repeatedly required to make license and spectrum payments, but these expenses
are not included in Vodafone's definition of 'free cash flow'. Once these are deducted,
Vodafone's free cash flow of 5.6 billion pounds falls to 3.1 billion
pounds. This is insufficient to cover the dividend payment of 4.8 billion. Wireless
came to the rescue with a 2.4 billion pound dividend payment to Vodafone in
2013.
The lesson for the investor is:
1. Do not trust headline
reporting by management. Unfortunately, the financial press and blogs tend
to use the same figures. Management's figures are at hand and many journalists
do not have the time to check them.
2. Whenever you see the adjective
'adjusted', work out what the adjustments are. Do they make sense? Or are
they merely a way to make management look better?
3. Free cash flow is useful,
but it is calculated in differing ways and is company specific.
4. There is no substitute for
studying the consolidated accounts and relevant notes to the accounts.
5. It is worth reading the
Chairman's, CEO's and CFO's reports in the annual report.
Self-congratulation when business is not going well is a sign of worse to come.
An honest appraisal of what needs to be done is a sign that it might actually
happen.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GlaxoSmithKline
Selection of
pills, courtesy Wikipedia
Glaxo is the 7th largest pharmaceutical company in
the world by revenue. Considering the growing proportion of spending on
healthcare worldwide, it is disappointing that Glaxo has made so little
financial progress these last 10 years. Consider:
1. Revenue has increased by
an average of 2% a year since 2003. And it has actually declined by 7% since
2009.
2. Profit after tax in 2012
(4.7 billion pounds) was the same as in 2003 (4.6 billion pounds).
3. Shareholders' Equity has
barely increased over the decade.
Glaxo has had to contend with the expiry of its
patents and the consequent competition from generic drugs. It is increasingly
difficult to discover new drugs and the cost of getting them approved by
America's Food and Drug Administration has escalated. In the last few years,
austerity has hit European market. The 4-billion pound US legal settlement for the
side effects from taking Avandia for diabetes, with the consequent loss of
market share, was a further blow to the company. Sales to the US are down by
11% since 2003.
Management has not been idle. The
2005 Annual Report was titled New Challenges: New Thinking. In 2008, Glaxo
identified a new strategy based on:
1. Grow a diversified global
business: to move away from the traditional 'white pills and western
market'. Revenues from outside Europe and America have grown from 31% of the
total in 2003 to 41% in 2012. And the company has developed a big vaccine
business.
2. Deliver more products of
value: to concentrate R&D on the most profitable sectors and
increase productivity. It is difficult to evaluate the success of this
strategy.
3. Simplifying the operating
model: the prime objective was to make annual cost savings of 2.2
billion pounds by 2014. In 2012, the company reported that it had made 2.5
billion in annual savings.
Management has leveraged the company
to buy back shares and pay for the new strategy. Glaxo is, as a result,
weaker financially now than in 2003. In 2003, Glaxo had net cash of
1.6 billion pounds; in 2012 it had net debt of 14 billion pounds. It would take
more than 3 years of free cash flow to pay it back. In 2003, the dividend was
covered 1.68 times by free cash flow; in 2012 this had fallen to 1.23 times
(after excluding the payment of 2.7 billion in legal expenses).
Return on equity (ROE) has also
suffered. While the
historical ROE was 82% on 2003's unleveraged balance sheet, the average return
on retained earnings since then is but 7%. This helps to explain the lack of
growth in earnings. Earnings per share have increased by 10% these past
10 years only because Glaxo has bought back 15% of its shares in this period.
With no real growth in its business,
but with a steady cash flow that can be relied on to pay dividends for the
foreseeable future and with an A+ credit rating for long-term debt, Glaxo
shares resemble a bond more than a common stock. Perhaps this explains its
current rating.
Glaxo's shares, like its UK competitor Astra-Zeneca,
have risen substantially more than the FTSE-100 in recent months. Both have
outperformed the FTSE 100 handily since 2008. And both weathered the financial
crisis well, reflecting the stable nature of their businesses.
Glaxo shares are currently rated on
an historical PE ratio of 19 and they yield 4.2% at 1765p. The 5-year earnings model for
Glaxo gives a value of 1250p a share, assuming a discount rate of 8.3% (3.3%
investment grade corporate bond and I add 5% for risk and a profit).
The cautious investor will note:
1. Glaxo shares have
increased in value by 34% since November 2012 (from 1314p a share).
2. The PE ratio of 19 cannot
be justified by a company with essentially no growth.
3. In the search for yield, the
present 4.2% yield on Glaxo shares could well be the overriding
attraction for the stock. If corporate bond rates increase significantly, or if
Glaxo's dividend is seen to be vulnerable to a cut, the shares could lose this
premium rating. For years Glaxo traded on a PE in the 9-12 range.